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On the basis of seminal work of Wiesner [1] ; Bennett and Brassard first invented quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [2] , and followed by their work other QKD protocols [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] have been proposed with a view to achieve unconditional security so as to outperform classical public key distribution technique since it provides conditional security. But noise is the hindrance to achieve this goal due to the fact, eavesdropper, manipulating noise, can jeopardize the security of QKD. So far, considering noise security of QKD has been conditionally proved [10] [11] [12] . On the other hand, Mayers [13] [14] , Lo and Chau [15] , and independently Lo [16] have presented some unconditional security proofs. But there is no unanimity [12, 15, 17] on the correctness of Mayers' proofs. The security proofs given by Lo and Chau and independently by Lo are based on fault-tolerant theory of quantum computation (FTQC) which is itself an untested theory. So their proofs will have to bear the uncertainty until FTQC is experimentally verified. Apart from these proofs, other researchers are also actively working [17] to prove unconditional security. But we observe that 100% reliability for complete security proof can be attained only after its experimental verification. At present, no such verification techniques exist. Then how would we get rid of the uncertainty ? We think, uncertainty regarding the security issue most reliably can be removed if raw protocol provides unconditional security without proving security at all. But the problem is that, existing protocols can not fulfill this simple demand. In the existing protocols, each individual state represents bit, and some of the bits will always be corrupted either by enviromental noise or by eavesdropper induced noise, which can not be distinguished by any means. Therefore, to prove unconditoinal security, error needs to be corrected in a completely secure way. By contrast, in our alternative approach, individual state does not represent bit but collectively they do. Later we shall see, this statistical feature (in addition to the other features) of encoding bits plays crucial role in achieving security avoiding the so-called error correction methods.
The basic idea behind this approach is to produce arbitrarily long sequence of bits randomly choosing the two comparatively short sequences, representing logical 0 and 1. In this method, the two sequences are two alternative preparation procedures of density matrix of the mixed state. The sequences are shared between the legitimate users.
As an illustration, let us take the two sequences of quantum states :
where S n 0 and S n 1 stand for bit 0 and 1 respectively and n is the total number of states in the sequences. These two sequences S n 0 and S n 1 are shared between sender Alice, and receiver Bob. The key, the sequence of sequences, is :
where N is the number of bits in the key. It is non-trivial to mention that the states in the sequences may or may not be orthogonal, types of states in the sequences can be more than two, and even two sequences can be prepared minimally just by the same two states, but the density matrix of the two sequences must be same i.e. ρ S 0 = ρ S 1 . We shall construct the equivalent density matrix using two different pairs of nonorthogonal state vectors of four dimensional Hilbertspace. From this protocol, the modus operandi of other protocols, based on this alternative approach, can be easily understood. This particular protocol can be used for standard two party secure communication and for the purpose of message splitting [18, 19] .
Before proceeding further, let us pinpoint that, the unconditional security of our crypto-system is based on the following well established propositions. 1. Sequences of known quantum states representing same density matrix are indistinguishable to all, except to the generator(s) of the sequences. 2. It is impossible to measure quantum state without disturbing it. 3. Decoherence is a stochastic process.
First, we describe preparation procedures of the shared sequences. Suppose, in a secret place, Alice and Bob are given 2n number of horizontally polarized (|↔ ) incoherent photons. They divide the photons into two halves to produce two sequences. To produce S n 0 , they split the wave function of each of the n photons with a symmetric (50:50) beam splitter. Now they do one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin, and if the result is "head", unitarily rotates the polarization by 90
• (|↔ s −→ | s ) and if "tail" she does nothing (|↔ s −→ |↔ s ). In the other path, called r, they do nothing (|↔ r −→ |↔ r ). The states are :
To produce S n 1 , similarly after splitting the state of each of the remaining n photons, they do one of the two things in the path s : toss a coin; if "heads", unitarily rotates by 45
• (|↔ s −→ |ր ւ s ) and if "tail", unitarily rotates by 135
• (|↔ s −→ |տ ց s ). Similarly in the other path r, they do nothing. The states are :
These states can be represented by the following base states:
In this basis, the density matrix of the two sequences is,
Needless to say, Alice and Bob both are generators of the sequences and they can generate/share the two sequences even in absence of photons. Now they are separated. Assuming Alice sends a single bit, either S n 0 or S n 1 , we shall first describe the Bob's method of identification of the bit. Bob can independently identify the bit in different ways since he knows the preparation codes. Whatever be the identification processes, Bob's objective is to find out the correlation of conclusive results of measurements with the shared sequences. For this protocol, we shall describe a particular method of identification.
In this method, Bob uses two sets of dual analyzers (DA) on the two resulting paths. The orientations of DA are : i) DA 0 = {0
• : 0
The measurements produce three types (A, B, C) of results:
where " √ " and " × " stand for " Yes" and " No" results respectively. The probabilities of these three kind of results for the four different superposition states are given in table 1 and 2 considering the statistical weight of the states and orientations of the dual analyzers. The results A and B provide which-path (W P ) information and the result C gives no-path (NP )information. But mere W P information is not enough to identify the state, and therefore the bit. Bob needs whichpath of which-state (W P W S) information. The result A does not give any W P W S information for any of the above two settings of DA. The NP information of result C is always inconclusive for any settings of the DA. The only result B provides conclusive W P W S information for proper choice of above two settings of DA. The W P W S information conclusively determines the state |ψ 1 for DA 0 and the state |φ 1 for DA 1 .
As Bob does not know the bit in advance, he always uses both sets of DA. At this point, Bob knows one of the reduced sequences contains conclusive W P W S information, but does not know which one. To know, first, he discards the states corresponding to discarded events from both of the shared sequences. Therefore, the length of the shared sequences are reduced. Now with these two reduced sequences of results and two reduced sequences of states, he performs four correlation tests to identify the bit. Out of these tests, only one of the reduced sequences of result would be totally correlated (assuming noise is not present) with one of the reduced sequences of states. For clarity, suppose, if the bit is 0 then the reduced sequences of shared states are: R n/8 0
The outcome of statistical tests are:
1 . Equality of two sets means complete correlation. So the test 2 reveals that bit is 0.
The proposition 1 ensures unconditional security of this single bit. Now they have to create large number of bits or logically at least 2n + 1 bits since they can always have unconditional security of 2n bits ( total number of shared states) using " one time pad" technique [20] . So they have to use the same shared sequences again and again. This repetitive use of the same sequences is clearly against the spirit of Shannon's theory of cryptography [20] and meant to loosing the advantage of extended no-cloning principle [21] that can be stated as: sequence of quantum states can not be cloned from a single copy of that sequence. Therefore, intercepting all the sequences of an arbitrarily long key, Eve, the eavesdropper, can exactly clone the two sequences and she can send the cloned sequences to Bob. In favor of eavesdropping, it is assumed that Eve uses very fast superlaminal signal to compensate the long time delay caused by her measurements. At this point, it seems that the advantage of uncertainty principle (measurement creates unavoidable disturbances) is lost. In the next sections, we shall discuss that the advantage of uncertainty principle can be taken by simple strategies suitable for ideal and nonideal environments. The strategies are same for all kind of measurements/attacks and applicable for all protocols belonging to this alternative procedure.
So far Alice and Bob allow Eve to access all the sequences. To exploit uncertainty principle, Alice will not send any new sequence/bit, until she is confirmed that Bob has truly got her bit. Therefore, Bob has to inform Alice whether the bit was intercepted or not. He can inform Alice without using classical channel. If bits are successfully received by Bob, he can send them back to Alice using another two shared sequences, having same density matrix, through the reverse arrangement of the apparatus. Alice following similar measurements can know that bit has reached to Bob. If Eve intercepts, then she will have to prepare the sequence on her guess. It will create 50% errors. As a consequence, Bob could not identify the bit. Bob can send totally depolarized photons to make Alice aware about interception. If Eve intercepts only the Bob's bit, then also bit is not returned to Alice. For both situations, Alice will stop transmission. Here, single-bit interception will be considered as total jamming of the channel that Eve can always do for all sorts of communications.
Let us come to the nonideal case. To impersonate as noise, indeed, eavesdropping has to be stochastic. So, eavesdropper can intercept some random events of every sequence determined by the noise level and her measurements.
However interception is random, there is a nonzero probability of accidental coincidence of events of identical sequences. The states of coincidental events can be cloned, if not totally. To help eavesdropper, it is assumed that statistics of the coincidental events is high. For a long key, Eve, in guise of noise, can gain more and more information and ultimately complete information about the two sequences. Note that, cloning is possible as because Eve knows the event number of each intercepted photons since she knows the length of the sequences. They can deprive her from this information. Therefore randomly intercepted events can not be correlated until and unless she knows the length of the two sequences. Eve can know the length if she intercepts consecutively many sequences/bits. But we have already discussed that even single-bit interception will not be allowed. If Eve still intercepts they will know by the above procedures. So in presence of noise unconditional security -security of each single bit -can be achieved without using classical channel (even message can be directly sent [7] using only quantum channel). Hence, the procedure can arbitrarily amplify the shared information surmounting Shannon's "no-go" theorem of repetition [20] .
The protocol can be extended for the purpose of distributing information [18, 19] between two receivers so that none of them individually acts on the secret key. To elucidate, suppose there are two receivers, Bob and Sonu, in the two resulting paths leading to the two secret rooms of the receiving center, where Bob is on the path r and Sonu on the path s and both of them share the sequences to be used to generate the key with Alice. Notice that, only s is the bit-carrying path. So Sonu independently can identify bit, but Bob can not. Bob always gets the same truncated state |↔ r . To give equal opportunity to Bob, Alice can make the path r as bit-carrying path. The states are:
For sake of Bob, Alice can prepare bits/sequences (Bob shares the preparation procedures) with these new superposition states. Due to this action, both of them are in similar position. Now if Alice randomly selects paths to encode the sequences, both of them will get 50% bits. So they have to co-operate to access the full key. Of course, they have to feedback each bit to Alice for authentication of the channel using their private sequences shared with Alice. Splitting the state vector into many paths and making every path as bit-carrying path at random, the protocol can be extended to distribute information among many users. As for example, the states can be split into three parts r, s and t for three receivers as follows,
The same density matrix of the sequence of states ψ 1 and ψ 2 (1:1) and the sequence of states φ 1 and φ 2 (1:1) in the representation R corresponding to the base states: Here bit-carrying path is t, so only receiver on path t will get the bit. If Alice randomly changes the bit-carrying path giving equal importance to each path, then each of the three receivers will get 33.33% bits of the key. This is a democratic distribution. Alice can also make unequal distribution of message among the receivers.
The practical advantage of these crypto-systems is that they can operate as long as noise is not 100% provided the statistics of the uncorrupted states is sufficient for identification of the sequences. So the outstanding problem of distant quantum communication (quantum signal can not be amplified and the technology of "quantum repeater" [15] is still in prenatal stage) can be overcome by this statistical approach. Reported error rates (3-4% for 24-60 Km) [22] [23] indicates that, it might be possible to communicate over several hundreds of kilometers using only few thousands of photons in the sequences. We are even optimistic about secure continental and satellite communication [24] with not-too-high statistics. For arbitrarily long distance, it is reasonable to set relay centers than arbitrarily increasing the statistics of the shared sequences. 
